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Chapter 2
One is the biggest number: 
estrangement, intimacy and 
totalitarianism in late Soviet Russia
Galina Oustinova-Stjepanovic
25 August 1968
At midday on 25 August 1968, eight people gathered in Moscow’s Red 
Square to protest against the military invasion of Czechoslovakia by 
Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops.1 According to a written account of one 
of the participants, Natalya Gorbanevskaya (2017 [1970]),2 the eight 
protesters barely had the time to unfurl home- made banners that  read 
–  among other things – ‘For your freedom and ours!’ when they were 
roughly apprehended. They were beaten, bundled into KGB vehicles 
and taken to the notorious Lubyanka prison, a scene of many politically 
motivated arrests. A predetermined closed trial ensued. Most protestors 
were sentenced to several years in labour camps, but two dissidents, 
Natalya Gorbanevskaya and Victor Faynberg, were taken to psychiatric 
hospitals and later exiled to France. 
During the trial of the Red Square protestors, Victor Faynberg 
was not put in the dock. Instead he was remanded in a hospital. During 
his interview with Dr Lunts and others, Faynberg allegedly displayed 
fascination with reformist ideas and came across as an arrogant person, 
convinced that he was right (Artemova, Rar and Slavinski 1971, 201). He 
was diagnosed with ‘psycho- other- thinking’ (shizoinakomysliye). Natalya 
Gorbanevskaya (who brought a newborn baby to the Red Square protest) 
was diagnosed with insanity, acquitted and placed under her mother’s 
care. Granted this reprieve, Gorbanevskaya compiled a collection of 
documents about the protest and the trial. She was re- arrested in 
December 1968 and, following an analysis of her poems for traces 
of mental health ‘pathologies’, was diagnosed with ‘sluggish schizo-
phrenia’ by Dr Lunts. He claimed that Gorbanevskaya’s schizophrenia 
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was so amorphous that it did not hinder her work and intellectual habits 
(Artemova, Rar and Slavinski 1971, 54–6). Nevertheless, during the 
trial Dr Lunts insisted that Gorbanevskaya was dangerous to the public 
because she was not fully aware of her mental condition (63). 
Legendary among dissidents, their historians and some Russian 
intellectuals, the protest had no transformative effect on Soviet politics 
(Komaromi 2012, 71).3 Nevertheless, for some human rights activists, 
constitutional rights defenders and civic activists, the event encapsulated 
a sustained effort to generate ‘a political otherwise’ through multiple 
conventional and experimental modes of dissent, including public truth 
speaking, embodied protest and ‘an exercise of oneself in the activity 
of thought’ (Povinelli 2012, 456). Nevertheless, the real significance of 
the protest was not its outcomes nor its critical content; the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia was and remained an ambivalent and troubling decision 
for many Soviet citizens and Party members. Rather the protest was 
subversive for its ability to materialise the repressive state as a felt, 
intimate presence (c.f. Ahmann 2018). Chloe Ahmann (2018) describes 
how protests can punctuate ‘sluggish temporalities of suffering’ (144), 
experienced as slow violence and attrition of political control in order 
to crystalise habitual, toxic environments into an event. Her argument 
strikes a chord with the post- Stalinist history of unspectacular state 
repression. 
Analytically, the event exposed a tension between the Soviet 
ideological imperative for unity and a value of outsideness, or vnye4 
(Yurchak 2005), as a space of intellectual, artistic and moral autonomy 
and critique. Outsideness was a common principle of living within the 
Soviet system (128). However, dissidents reified the alleged cohesion 
(splochennost) of the Soviet people to claim repeatedly an exclusive 
capacity to think differently, speak the truth and act in accord with 
their conscience (Boobbyer 2005), understood as a universal ethical 
beginning unsullied by party politics. Gorbanevskaya’s memoirs of the 
Red Square protest (2017) mention her friends’ intent to split away and 
stand apart (otmezhevatsa) from the dominant univocal opinion (10) 
and unanimous support of the Party’s decisions (23). 
Gorbanevskaya and others denied that sedition or even political 
motives had inspired their protest.5 Instead they reiterated a commitment 
to inakomysliye, or ‘other- thinking’ (thinking differently). In their defence 
speech, the protestors spoke about the right to express critical views 
that diverge from commonly acceptable opinions (221–4), while the 
prosecution accused them of trampling on the ‘norms’ of existence (240) 
and literally ‘sound thought’ (zdravii smysl) of the Soviet people (256). 
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Although the Soviet repressive apparatuses were probably more irked by 
public displays of dissent rather than criticism per se (Field 1995, 277), 
‘other- thinking’ was a proud self- attribute of dissidents then and now.
In contrast, for Soviet prosecution and psychiatrists, other- thinking 
was an instantiation of ‘oppositionism’ (Halfin 2001). Predictable within 
the Soviet conceptual premises of scientism, dissent and oppositionism 
were liable to be explained as ‘a mental predicament’ (Halfin 2001, 319), 
a temporary eclipse of reason and delusion that could be treated thera-
peutically. With Khrushchev’s formal notion that dissent was a mental 
illness (Brintlinger 2007, 4), the aetiology of madness was disengaged 
from social conditions; dissent was not a response to the state politics, 
but rather an anomaly that the state had a responsibility to eliminate. 
Thus there appeared a shift from politicising mental illness and dissent 
during the early days of the revolutionary state (Sirotkina 2007) to 
pathologising both. 
A notion of dissent as pathology does not fully explain why some 
dissidents were sent to prison and others hospitalised. The criteria 
for differentiating between political and intellectual dissidents and 
‘mad’ Soviet citizens remain obscure without documentary evidence 
of psychiatric deliberation, which might not have a written trace. For 
instance, both Gorbanevskaya and Faynberg had a prior history of 
referrals to psychiatrists which would feature on their files. These, taken 
into consideration with linear, deterministic theories of personality, 
served to prompt an interpretation of Gorbanevskaya’s participation in 
the 25 August protest as a medical condition rather than as a conscious 
political gesture. However, a possibility of casting political dissent as 
madness, even if hospitalisation was not the inevitable punishment, 
suggests that the Soviet state was interested both in diminishing the 
value of political dissent (and the status of its individual members) 
and in controlling the innermost recesses of human subjectivities. 
To do so it employed a variety of methods described by Halfin as ‘the 
hermeneutics of the soul’ (Halfin 2001, 316). At the same time, the 
treatment of dissent as madness implied a possibility of cure and reha-
bilitation, further complicating a narrative of ideological misuse of 
punitive psychiatry and imprisonment (c.f. Thomas 2014). Put simply, 
to pathologise dissent as madness was to deny its efficacy as a political 
gesture. 
In addition to understanding the logic of representation of political 
dissent as madness, my current research in Moscow seeks to comprehend 
the paradoxical ontology (as the fact of existence) of totalitarianism 
as intimacy with the many and dissent as a claim to ‘other- thinking’ 
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(inakomysliye) and estrangement from an abstract collectivity in late 
Soviet  Russia –  and, to some extent, today.6 
First, how did dissidents succeed in producing a political value 
other than the status quo (Gratton 2014, 117), given the conditions 
of totalitarianism that presume all- encompassing control and total 
identification with the party state? The paradox lies within dissidents’ 
claims to ‘other- thinking’ as a political statement rather than a mental 
predicament, together with their simultaneous affirmation of the 
existence of totalitarianism as actual and experiential workings of the 
state’s power. Claims of totalitarianism would have signalled defeat of 
oppositional activities because dissent and other- thinking (inakomysliye) 
were considered logical impossibilities under the conditions of ‘actually 
existing totalitarianism’ (Bergman 1998, 251). If the Soviet state had 
been ‘really’ totalitarian, and so had exerted control over all aspects of 
Soviet life, how could dissidents have ever distanced themselves from 
the dominance of a regime that had such crippling effects as loss of 
moral judgement and political apathy (Bergman 1998, 257)? How could 
dissidents justify their own exception? How did they cultivate political, 
intellectual and artistic spaces of personal autonomy (Komaromi 2012) 
within the state or following their flight abroad?
Second, why was a small- scale protest such as this so troubling 
for the Soviet authorities? One explanation is that dissent as estrange-
ment from the reified Soviet peoplehood contravened an ideological 
imperative of intimacy with the many. It posited the possibility of 
an alternative circle of intimacy with politically ‘like- minded’ (edino-
myshleniki) persons who frequently disseminated their views through 
networks of family, friends and colleagues. Dissident circles cultivated 
a sense of togetherness and detachment from others through shared 
commitment to ideas, engagement in samizdat activities and the 
collection and distribution of money and food for political prisoners 
and their families, as well as everyday socialising. Numerous memoirs 
and interviews point to a pervasive ‘fellow feeling’ (Hankins 2019, 170), 
defined by Joseph Hankins as a historical ‘connection through similar 
placements’ (185). I would like to argue that, in Soviet Russia, those 
placements of dissent were marked by two political modes of intimacy, 
namely closeness to other dissidents and detachment from the abstract 
‘we’ of the Soviet state. 
The rhetorical ‘circle of the We’ (Hollinger 1993) extended to all 
Soviet people, despite countervailing tendencies toward differentia-
tion and ethnic particularism, among other things (Slezkine 1994). As 
an overarching objective, the Soviet peoplehood was a communitarian 
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project premised on the notion of unity of all. Such a communitarian 
project presupposes a normative and psychological affinity or solidarity 
akin to claims of a prepolitical, affective ‘society’ or ‘nation’ (Levy 2017). 
Against the grain of the primacy of totality, dissent as estrangement 
openly challenged the premises of political unity of the workers, with 
its improbable commonality of ideas, values and practice. Thus the 
embodied intimacy of engagement with dissident activities and ideas 
posited a challenge to an abstract mode of intimacy with the Soviet ‘we’. 
In sum, the broadening and closing of intimate political circles allows 
us to reimagine dissent and totalitarianism as alternative forms of unity 
that shared a vocabulary of intimacy and estrangement but implied a 
difference in degree and scale.
Totalitarian intimacy
In extant scholarship, an effort to resolve the paradox of dissent under the 
conditions of totalitarianism is situated within a realist paradigm: either 
the Soviet party state was not totalitarian or dissidents were not free 
agents of other- thinking, as they saw themselves. For instance, Hannah 
Arendt defines ‘totalitarianism’ as absolute political control, including 
rectification of thought and effacement of socio- political antagonisms 
and contradictions (Arendt 1976 [1958], xxiii–xxiv). Totalitarianism 
signals the ‘enormity of the [state] power’ (Bergman 1998, 248) that 
subjugates any oppositional thought and activity. 
In addition, Hannah Arendt’s classic definition of Soviet and Nazi 
totalitarianism underscores loyalty to a leader and concrete historical 
conditions of mass mobilisation of atomised individuals (1976 [1958], 
324). For her, totalitarianism as a practical political action is successful in 
shaping an ideal- type character and concrete empirical product of totali-
tarian mechanisms of violent control of subjectivities: the ‘mass- man’ 
(Sigwart 2016). The mass, the mob, the crowd, the undifferentiated 
multitude constitute the subject of a totalitarian society and ‘the rebus of 
collective politics’ (Mazzarella 2015, 105–6). It vividly conjures an image 
of collective frenzy and fanaticism of ‘a swarm’ (Toscano 2010, xv). The 
pathos is menacing: totalitarianism and fanaticism are essentially the 
same because they cultivate a blind commitment to an abstract idea 
among the multitude of people (Toscano 2010, xix). The monotony of 
multitude is reiterated in spatial, architectural and design metaphors of 
flatness as invariance (Higman 2017), also conceptually associated with 
totalitarianism. 
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Guided by the above definitions, some historians look for historical 
evidence for or against the empirical reality of totalitarianism. A great 
deal of literature on totalitarianism enumerates traits and characteristics 
of a totalitarian society to ascertain what authoritarian orders fit such 
description (for example, Mirskii 2003). Conventionally fascist Italy, 
Nazi Germany, Stalin’s Soviet Union and Mao’s China meet the criteria 
although, of necessity, the argument is circular: the key attributes of 
totalitarianism are deduced from a study of a totalitarian society which is 
re- affirmed as totalitarian ipso facto. 
Soviet scholarship denied that the term had any relevance to the 
politics of the Soviet Union. It used totalitarianism as a synonym of 
fascism (Bergman 1998, 252), although the subtle parallels were drawn 
by a few Soviet historians from the 1960s onwards. Slavoj Žižek (2001) 
finds the term ‘totalitarianism’ unhelpful because, for him, it defeats 
the Left (4) and ‘relieves us of a duty to think’ (138) about socialism 
as anything other than a Gulag ideology. For him, the term has been 
misused as a denunciation mechanism of any radical emancipatory 
project and its utopian or universal credentials. 
Žižek was not the only one to question the meanings, origins and 
implications of theories of totalitarianism in Soviet Russia, although 
others had their own, and different, purposes. Some dissidents, including 
a Russian writer with nationalist leanings, Solzhenitsin, believed ‘totali-
tarianism’ to be a Western imposition on authentic Russian culture. 
Others racialised totalitarianism as Russia’s ‘intrinsic’ inclinations 
towards barbarism, submissiveness, tyranny and denial of personal 
freedom (Bergman 1998, 255). 
Notwithstanding the term’s problematic theoretical character, 
many Soviet dissidents of the post- Stalinist period applied it to their 
own historical experiences to contextualise disturbing encounters with 
the party state. Instead of theorising ‘totalitarianism’, the notion was 
thus adopted specifically to identify a felt experience of the repressive 
mechanisms of the Soviet party state. As many Soviet people questioned 
the nature of Soviet totalitarianism, for Soviet dissidents it had appeared 
as an undeniable materiality of court rooms, prisons, psychiatric 
hospitals, KGB officers and so on.
A comparable line of reasoning, this time about the reality of 
dissent, informs Benjamin Nathans’ argument: that contrary to dissidents’ 
self- understanding, their protest did not occasion a dramatic confronta-
tion between ‘official’ and ‘nonconformist’ positions in the Soviet Union 
(Nathans 2012, 177). Serguei Oushakine (2001) suggests that political 
dissidents voiced objections to totalitarianism and unlawfulness of the 
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state practices that were identical to the critical discourses about glasnost 
among reformers within the Soviet government from the 1950s onwards. 
The same stock of questions worried Gorbachev- era politicians who had 
to explain their own capacity for critical thinking and prospects of socio- 
political restructuring. Some reformers doubted the empirical validity 
and scope of totalitarianism, seeking rather to qualify Soviet totalitari-
anism as partial and consensual (Bergman 1998, 265). Thus ‘totalitari-
anism’ was redefined as an aspiration rather than actuality. Nevertheless, 
it remained closely linked to nefarious socio- political and psychological 
effects of unlimited power, including the erosion of human autonomy 
and a lack of ethical judgement. 
It follows that ‘absolute ideological uniformity’ (Oushakine 2001, 
212) and the intimacy with the party state were an ideological projection, 
as political realities were inevitably diverse within and outside the 
Communist Party ranks. As a consequence, Oushakine contends, there 
was no ‘external’ position available to dissidents. What made dissident 
rhetoric an act of resistance was its ‘locus of enunciation’ rather than the 
message per se (204), as well as an intensification of the existing critical 
discourse and an appeal to universal truth and sincerity. In fact, the main 
demand among dissidents was a public acknowledgement of a simple 
fact of disagreement (212) and discrepancies between a designate and 
actuality. Dissidents thus demanded the recognition of the Soviet state 
as partocracy rather than democracy (211); this also resonated with 
a paradoxical call for greater realism and sincerity in literature and 
art dominated by heroic, embellished forms of so- called social realism 
(Kozlov 2013, 44).
Building on my own archival and ethnographic encounters, I 
agree with the above arguments: totalitarianism was not all inclusive, 
nor were dissidents unique in their critical capacities. Nevertheless, the 
stylistic ploy of ‘things are not what they seem’ is stifling. This means 
that the controversy over the empirical evidence for or against Soviet 
‘totalitarianism’ turns a blind eye to the ideational significance of a 
deeper political principle of the primacy of whole and the intimacy with 
the many that dominated the Soviet conceptual universe. I suggest that, 
despite being exploited during and after Cold War enmities (Geyer 
and Fitzpatrick 2009, 8), the notion of ‘totalitarianism’ points to the 
creation of an ethico- political value of totality and ‘wholeness’ that 
reverberated across pre- revolutionary and Soviet Russian utopian and 
folk theories, philosophy and ethics, as well as the administrative and 
economic practices of joint responsibility and collective ownerships 
(Stites 1989). Dissidents laboured not only against the state institutions, 
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but also against the ethico- political value of totality, to which they had 
juxtaposed estrangement as a way of life (Boym 1996).
For instance, the idea of the primacy of the whole underpins a 
constellation of notions of ‘freedom’ in Russian. The words svoboda, mir 
and volya all convey a sense of membership among one’s own people, 
but with subtle differences (Humphrey 2007). Svoboda, for example, 
is not centred on an individual. It is rather predicated on ‘an entry 
into a privileged political state of liberty, rather than a move out from 
captivity into an indefinite state called freedom’ (Humphrey 2007, 2). 
In contrast, mir is an expansive concept that refers to a particular life 
world and limitless universe. If svoboda demarcates a bounded world, 
mir presupposes outward existence. Last but not least, volya merges 
boundless freedom with an individual will and despotic power, both 
unstable as they ebb or intensify (Humphrey 2007, 6–7).
In sum, contrary to Žižek, I would like to take the term totalitari-
anism seriously, but to shy away from the polemical controversy about 
whether the Soviet state was or was not totalitarian. Instead, I approach 
‘totalitarianism’ as an imaginary or a conceptual topology of totalitari-
anism that mattered in the discursive fields of dissent regardless of its 
correspondence to reality or lack thereof.7 In addition, I aim to illuminate 
this conceptual topology as a philosophical problem of relating and prior-
itising parts and whole. Thus I suggest that the idea of the primacy of the 
whole and implicated notions of freedom through a privileged political 
membership permeated everyday thought, professional scholarship and 
political programmes of many participants in Soviet Russia. Wholeness 
and interconnected collectivity featured in post- Stalinist dissident 
writings (Komaromi 2015, 4), but as an alternative aggregate of friends 
and like- minded people (edinomyshlenniki), brought together by political 
and research activities and interests, as well as drinking, sexual relations, 
sleepovers, shared childcare and family holidays, underlaid with an 
exhilarating sense of conspiracy. Freedom was found in estrangement 
from the Soviet peoplehood and in intimate interactions within dissident 
circles, yet was imagined as a link with the rest of humanity and its 
alleged universal values. 
In sum, a shift from totalitarianism to totality as a value allows 
me to elicit a deeper relational order of dissent as a transgression of 
the idea of the primacy of the whole. To flesh out the value of totality 
empirically, I draw on archival materials and studies of the political 
abuse of psychiatry in Soviet Russia that exemplify a much broader intel-
lectual and socio- political history of fascination with totality in Soviet 
and European thought and practices. As we have seen, some dissidents in 
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post- Stalinist Russia were ‘punished with madness’ (Artemova, Rar and 
Slavinski 1971) – that is, sent to the psychiatric hospitals that flourished 
in the post- Stalinist period. 
From a pragmatic point of view, psychiatric hospitals embodied 
an excessive form of exclusion and isolation from the social. However, 
it is not entirely clear to me why and how the link between dissent and 
schizophrenia was justified in Soviet psychiatry and political settings. I 
would like tentatively to suggest that in Soviet psychiatry schizophrenia 
was broadly defined as withdrawal from reality and dissociation from 
a social collective, which in turn was a foundational concept of Soviet 
Marxist ethics. The diagnosis of schizophrenia was applied to dissidents 
who, according to their forensic psychiatry reports, failed to grasp the 
primacy of the whole. What we see is a reiteration of the logic of intimacy 
and estrangement from the many. 
Unity of thought
In August 1968 the Soviet newspapers described the Red Square 
protestors as ‘otschepentsi’, with a pejorative meaning of splintering 
away from the whole. In Soviet newspapers the protest was constructed 
as a violation of the unity of the Soviet people and a betrayal of 
intimacy (or complicity, in the dissidents’ terms) with the party state 
in the face of ideological enemies. Gorbanevskaya’s memoirs contain 
numerous newspaper clippings proclaiming unwavering support for the 
invasion among Soviet citizens. On behalf of the vast and heterogeneous 
Soviet population, the newspapers spoke of unity, shared understanding 
(obschaya positsiya), socialist commonwealth, unshakable solidarity and 
unanimous approval of the Soviet actions (Gorbanevskaya 2017, 22–4, 
30). In mainstream Soviet media the military intervention was construed 
as a moment of renewed ideological requirements for conformity 
with the state and with the Communist Party. Brezhnev’s doctrine of 
‘developed socialism’ (Nathans 2011, 180) announced the arrival of the 
era of ‘genuine collectivism’ (183) and, crucially, its conditionality on the 
state’s control. In sharp contrast informal accounts, diaries and memoirs 
of political and other dissidents and ordinary Soviet people referred 
to the invasion as the endpoint of a liberal period that had proffered 
hope for an alternative, perhaps more liberal pathway for Warsaw Pact 
socialism.
Fully aware of the consequences, the eight protestors in Red Square 
saw no political utility in their actions (Gorbanevskaya 2017, 10). 
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They did not expect to achieve anything concrete and some continue 
to describe their actions as an ‘apolitical gesture’ (interview with Pavel 
Litvinov, December 2017). Even eyewitnesses were unaffected because 
they found the flashpoint protest puzzling: some thought the participants 
were Czechs (Gorbanevskaya 2017, 40) or Jews (45) disrupting public 
order. For the participants, the protest was not a means to any specific 
political end, but a compulsory action, a moral dictate of universal 
human conscience.8 Somewhat akin to the relentless but inconsequen-
tial letter writing of many Soviet citizens to the Party leaders, the 1968 
protest was a well- considered gesture of dissociation (otmezhevatsa) 
from the presumed consensus (Boobbyer 2008, 134). 
The consensus was an ideological construct and a somewhat 
exaggerated (some say self- serving) claim to exception among some 
dissidents. Many more Soviet citizens, including reformists within the 
Communist Party leadership, disapproved of the military intervention. 
For example, a sociological survey of attitudes to the invasion carried out 
clandestinely in a small Russian town from September 1968 to March 
1969 revealed a profound ambivalence and intergenerational divide 
about the Soviet invasion (Zaslavsky and Z* 1981). The majority of 
younger people (between 18 and 30 years old) offered weak support, 
while about 47 per cent of the over 50s (who comprised ten people out of 
a sample of 352 respondents) approved of the Soviet- led invasion. 
Even among the highest- ranking Soviet leadership, presided 
over by Brezhnev, the use of power did not seem inevitable or wise 
(Bischof, Karner and Ruggenthaler 2010). The Soviet government was 
deeply divided. Some members of the Soviet leadership feared that 
a military intervention would undermine the conciliatory rhetoric of 
Nikita Khrushchev and Aleksei Kosygin, both of whom felt that the 
antagonism between the West and the Soviet Union had shifted from 
military to economic competition (Bischof, Karner and Ruggenthaler 
2010) that opened the door for socialist reforms and liberalisation. 
However, Leonid Brezhnev fanned public anxieties by emphasising 
the ideological differences between the West and the Soviet sphere. In 
Brezhnev’s rhetoric, Soviet socialism was perpetually threatened from 
outside and from  within –  by spies, dissenters, reformers and so on. Thus, 
despite initial equivocations about its goals and outcomes, the invasion 
became the crunch moment to silence the reformers within the Soviet 
Communist Party and dissidents among Soviet citizens. 
Clearly the unity of thought was a projection of homogeneity 
that did not correspond to historical reality. However, the trope had 
felt consequences. Specifically, following a brief but optimistic (as it 
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is remembered today) decade of de- Stalinisation, the late 1960s and 
1970s revived the persecution of ‘other- thinking’ (inakomysliye) in a 
multiplicity of its forms. The term was applied to activists for human 
rights, religious liberties, Jewish migration, nationalist and ethnic self- 
determination, civic rights, socialist Leninist reformists and defenders 
of constitutional rights (Nathans 2007), as well as Jewish, German 
and Chinese ‘otkazniki’, or refuseniks.9 It also encompassed writers, 
artists, actors, singers, philosophers, sociologists and others who did not 
necessarily oppose the socialist order, or even its partocratic structures, 
but simply engaged with experimental artistic genres, schools of thought 
and research methods. In the Soviet legal jargon, inakomysliye signalled 
anti- Soviet agitation and perfidious representations of Soviet reality. In 
a targeted campaign against inakomysliye, state institutions and agents 
would threaten, detain, interrogate, demote or dismiss from a job, exile 
internally or abroad and sentence people to labour camps, prisons and 
psychiatric hospitals that represented inakomysliye as a mental illness. 
Dissent and madness
After the Red Square protest, Natalya Gorbanevskaya and Victor 
Faynberg were sent to the psychiatric wards in Serbsky Psychiatric 
Hospital in Moscow (Faynberg was later transferred to Leningrad). 
Other protestors were sent to labour camps that remained a more 
likely destination for a political dissident. An avalanche of letters from 
dissidents, their families and friends brought to the attention of the 
Soviet government and international organisations that incarceration 
of healthy10 people in psychiatric wards constituted a blatant abuse of 
power and a betrayal of medical ethics. However, it has been argued that 
some Soviet psychiatrists may have genuinely believed that dissidents 
suffered from ‘a mental anomaly’ (Wilkinson 1986, 642). This later claim 
should not be misread as a justification of political abuse of psychiatry 
nor as a plea of innocence on behalf of Soviet psychiatrists. My question is 
rather what presuppositions and arguments made it possible to represent 
involvement in a seditious political activity as a mental problem? 
Gorbanevskaya and Faynberg were examined in one of the most 
notorious organs and locations of forensic or criminal psychiatry 
(sudebnaya psihiatriya), the Serbsky Institute of Forensic Psychiatry 
in Moscow. The referral to a hospital did not need justification 
(neobosnovan), which in itself was seen by dissidents as an illegal, uncon-
stitutional practice. Dissidents did not know why some ‘healthy persons’ 
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(zdoroviye lyudi) were referred for psychiatric assessment as potentially 
‘schizophrenic’ or ‘insane’.11 Objections to the hospitalisation of mentally 
healthy people in psychiatric wards is recurrent in the handwritten and 
typewritten letters frequently sent to the Soviet Ministry of Health or 
the Government, with copies passed to dissidents and samizdat activists 
in the late Soviet period. Many letters are preserved in the Memorial 
Society in present- day Moscow and other archives. Such letters describe 
a moment of detention that could start with a casual knock on the door 
and a request to follow the police (militsiya) or a security officer (KGB) 
to a hospital. A superficial physical examination, including a temperature 
and blood pressure check- up, could prompt a medical worker to prescribe 
a course of psychotropic injections (psihotropiki); these, according to 
many patients, induced sleepiness, sickness, headaches and immobility. 
The whole process was condemned by dissidents and their supporters 
as an unlawful violation of the Soviet Constitution. Furthermore, most 
letters presumed that the reasons for being sectioned were accusations 
and fabricated charges of anti- Soviet activities of prisoners and/or their 
family members. One could be rapidly discharged only to face disability 
and socio- economic consequences such as unemployment.
However, the Serbsky Institute where Gorbanevskaya and Faynberg 
were assessed was already a prison- like institution. A former tsarist police 
detention unit, it became a centre for research and a psychiatric prison in 
1923. Its founder, Vladimir Serbsky, had championed the understanding 
of social conditions in mental illness (Bloch and Reddaway 1977, 36). 
By the 1970s the Institute was directed by Dr Lunts, a major authority 
in Soviet psychiatry. He is remembered as an ‘utter bastard’ by Moscow 
dissidents and their families and friends. 
Dr Daniil Lunts defined mental illness as a failure to represent 
reality and act upon it (1970, 8). Symptoms included hallucinations 
and false convictions, accompanied by disengagement from reality or its 
 inappropriate/wrong perception (nepravilnoe ponimaniye) (14) and their 
manifestations in anti- social behaviour (19). According to Lunts, Soviet 
forensic science was entrusted with a job of determining culpability, 
effective treatment and the reintegration of psychiatric patients into 
society, as well as safeguarding the public from dangerous people with 
mental health problems (19–20).
Some wards in the Serbsky Institute were classified as state secret 
‘specialised hospitals’ (‘spetsbolnitsi’), administered by the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs rather than the Soviet Ministry of Health. Dissidents wrote 
about doctors in white overalls with KGB shoulder marks underneath: 
the ‘psycho- fascists’ of Soviet medicine, according to some samizdat 
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letters. The image speaks volumes about a recurrent assumption about 
a dual reality that was genuine and deceptive. However, on a more 
immediate level of analysis, it also highlights the horror of psychiatric 
abuse with political aims and points to a fact that psychiatrists in Soviet 
Russia required political as well as medical qualifications (Bloch and 
Reddaway 1977, 44). 
It is important to keep in mind that, as an alternative to Stalin’s 
methods of mass repressions and executions, criminal psychiatric wards 
multiplied in the post- Stalin period. In 1978 Kosygin, by then Chairman 
of the Council of Ministers, ordered the construction of more than 80 
new hospitals (some of which were never completed). In a postscript 
to his study on punitive medicine,12 Alexander Podrabinek explained 
that not only political dissidents but any inconvenient person could 
be  sectioned –  including ordinary people who dared to criticise their 
management, exposed a violation of constitutional rights or administra-
tive irregularities or attempted ‘a flight abroad’ by making inquiries at a 
foreign embassy. Forcible psychiatric treatment of dissidents, refuseniks 
(otkazniki), public figures, musicians, poets and ordinary people 
continued until 1988, when Article 70 on ‘Anti- Soviet propaganda and 
agitation’ and defamation laws of the Soviet Russian (RSFSR) Criminal 
Code were repealed.
Most dissidents were held together with the criminally insane, drug 
addicts and other people suffering from ‘genuine’ mental health illness. 
In letters passed to samizdat, some dissidents conveyed their distress at 
sharing a room with convicted killers. Other dissidents were shocked to 
witness people collecting their own faeces, screaming obscenities and 
being restrained and beaten by nurses, many recruited from former 
convicts. Thus psychiatric wards were not a more ‘humane’ form of 
political  control –  a view voiced at a public lecture in May 2018 in lieu of 
an explanation of why Gorbanevskaya, a single mother of two, was not 
sentenced to prison.
In fact a stint in a psychiatric hospital was often a preliminary stage 
(etapirovaniye) on the way to a prison camp. Some people were moved 
from prisons into psychiatric wards after suicide attempts, for example 
swallowing nails in a political prison. In a samizdat letter Semyon 
Gluzman, a Soviet psychiatrist who systematically studied abuse and was 
sentenced for his research, explained that, within the punitive system 
of Soviet prisons, suicide was a sign of despair rather than of mental 
illness. But material conditions in labour camps and psychiatric hospitals 
were often comparable. Food lacked nutrition and diversity, and food 
parcels from friends and relatives were frequently stolen. Patients were 
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treated with cold shower therapies while they practically suffocated in 
hot wards with bolted windows and no ventilation or fresh air. Isolation 
was commonly mentioned in letters republished in samizdat literature. 
Access to the toilets was often denied. In short, even though straight-
jackets were not used, the general aim was to  immobilise –  that is, to 
restrict and slow down physical movement and intellectual activity.
As a result, for some dissidents, psychiatric hospitals were a harsher 
punishment than forced labour camps. Patients were medicalised into 
a vegetative- like state accompanied by headaches and nightmares. 
Neuroleptic drugs caused severe side- effects such as stomach ulcers, 
insomnia and depression. Most importantly, they halted dissidents’ 
intellectual labour. Arguably, even Stalin’s Gulag camps allowed some 
prisoners to be creative intellectually: some prisoners wrote poetry, 
studied literary texts and managed to draw in the most squalid conditions 
(Etkind 2013). In contrast, intellectual prisoners in psychiatric hospitals 
lived in a drug- induced stupor. They were frequently prevented from 
writing and reading, to the point that reading science fiction, for example, 
could be interpreted as a symptom of madness. 
For some, psychiatric hospitals were seen as an acceptable alternative 
to prison. Many Soviet hippies performed and celebrated madness to 
dodge army conscription and mock social norms, but they also feared an 
onset of real madness triggered by prescribed drugs (Fürst 2018). For the 
poet Joseph Brodsky, psychiatric detention was a balancing act between 
intellectual freedom and a total loss of creative consciousness, including 
incapacity to work (Reich 2013). Nevertheless many dissidents feared 
psychiatric hospitals more than labour camps because they stripped them 
of their  individuality –  a process described as loss of ‘distinctiveness’ of the 
self13 and of one’s political identity. For instance individuality, as a sense 
of one’s juridical and political ‘I’, was an important theoretical question 
that preoccupied defenders of human rights (Komaromi 2015, 76) and 
Orthodox religious dissidents (Ganson 2013). The former situated an 
individual within a legal framework of democratic rights distribution 
that could strengthen a position of an individual as a citizen in possession 
of individual rights. The latter pondered the problem of atomisation as 
a breakdown of community links that could be healed through renewal 
of religious solidarity (Ganson 97). For dissident priests, godless society 
resulted in an experience of isolation within a crowd (98) – a simul-
taneous loss of individuality and loneliness of isolation that haunted 
political dissidents in psychiatric prisons. Thus an alternative to the ‘total-
itarian’ unity of thought was, in the dissident Petro Grigorenko’s words, 
‘a community of  persons –  rational, proud, independent in everything 
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and tolerant of each other, voluntarily cooperating in the course of 
interaction’ (Reich 2014, 582) and/or a community of believers within 
the Russian Orthodox Church (Ganson 2013).
Similarly, in a letter to samizdat (dated 1971), one political 
prisoner agonised that the loss of all his rights entailed a concomitant 
loss of political subjecthood. Textbooks on criminal psychiatry distin-
guished between pravosposobnost and deesposobnost – a capacity to 
have rights and a capacity to acquire and exercise rights, and so to 
assume responsibilities and duties as a citizen, respectively (Morozova 
1977). Pravosposobnost was ascribed at birth while deesposobnost was 
predicated on purposeful intelligent activity (planomernaya rassuditel-
naya deyatelnost) (72). A diagnosis of madness thus not only made 
ordinary Soviet people squeamish (brezgliv) about dissidents. It also 
deprived a dissident of his or her rights and, crucially, of a legitimate 
voice in domestic political affairs by depoliticising their protest as 
psychotic behaviour (Field 1995, 278). 
Sluggish schizophrenia
Sluggish schizophrenia was a medical term coined by Soviet psychia-
trists in 1920–39 to describe mild borderline cases and the tempo of 
schizophrenia (Zajicek 2018). Because it was seen as an early stage of a 
progressive mental disorder, sluggish schizophrenia lacked a precise list 
of symptoms. This indeterminacy was a handy politicised tool of criminal 
psychiatry and the Soviet prosecution, as almost any behaviour, especially 
the strength of dissidents’ conviction and their self- righteousness,14 could 
be assessed as sluggish  schizophrenia –  a potentiality of a mental illness 
rather than its full- blown version. In other words, forensic psychiatry in 
the Soviet Union claimed to spot psychological ‘anomalies’ without any 
manifest symptoms, even if a patient contradicted medical experts and 
claimed that he or she was psychologically robust (Morozova 1977, 5). 
In many ways Soviet psychiatric manuals contained a self- authorisation. 
Nevertheless, Soviet psychiatric manuals did publish various 
definitions of schizophrenia and sluggish schizophrenia. Schizophrenia 
was described as an (anti-)social illness because the Marxist framework 
highlighted the role of social conditions in determining mental health. 
Consequently, it was said that schizophrenia entailed a withdrawal from 
social contract (Zajicek 2018, 3). For example, Dr Sukhareva, who was 
among the first to engage with sluggish schizophrenia, described it as a 
propensity for solitude and emotional flatness in the late 1930s. In the 
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Brezhnev era Dr Snezhnevski expanded the list (Field 1995, 287) of 
fuzzy symptoms to include perseverance, struggle for truth, manifesta-
tion of reformism and litigiousness (Reich 2014, 566). Occasionally 
sluggish schizophrenia was identified with ‘philosophical intoxication’, 
unconventional and experimental thought, interest in abstract ideas and 
a tendency to offer ‘bizarre’ interpretations and theories. 
A case study of a murder suspect profiled the defendant as 
somebody who, despite his emotional aloofness, entertained paranoid 
ideas about making an invention or discovery in biology and physics and 
claimed to have written ‘award- worthy’ manuscripts titled ‘Gnoseology’ 
and ‘Theoretical Mechanics’ (Morozova 1977, 65). The defendant, 
accused of beheading his manager, gave an impression of looking 
down on the investigators. For the Soviet experts, it was a textbook 
case of schizophrenia. Soviet forensic psychiatry pledged to carry out 
prophylactic measures against such socially harmful tendencies (7–8). 
Vehemently opposed to trendy philosophical teachings (modniye filosof-
skiye ucheniya), Morozova appeared scornful of Western psychiatry 
for treating psychological maladies (rasstroystva) as acts of personal 
rebellion against existing public order (8). For Morozova, any ‘odd’ 
behaviour, including ‘incorrect and inappropriate’ (nepravilnoye i neadik-
vatnoye) (11) conduct during an investigation, could be a justification for 
psychiatric evaluation. 
According to a KGB report on Zhores Medvedev,15 a prominent 
Leninist Marxist, his ‘mental illness’ comprised the following symptoms:
• A persistent mania for truth- seeking
• Having a beard
• Meticulous habits of thought
• A belief that the invasion of Czechoslovakia was an act of transgres-
sion of sovereign borders
• A conviction that he should devote his life to the ideals of communism
• Attempts to prove his point
• Inclinations to philosophising
• Scriptomania, or writing excessively
• Shouting out about his fight for democracy and truth
In his letter in defence of Zhores Medvedev,16 Solzhenitsyn noted that 
Medvedev was told that he was ‘abnormal’ because ‘normal people’ 
thought alike. 
Another dissident, Petro  Grigorenko –  admired as a Soviet general 
who joined dissidents to defend ethnic minorities in Crimea and speak 
AMARASURIYA 9781787357792 PRINT.indd   37 30/07/2020   13:31
38 THE InTIMATE L IFE OF DISSEnT
against the abuse of  psychiatry –  was given a similar diagnosis during 
one of his internments in the Serbsky Institute. He was described as a 
well- adjusted individual with excellent memory and concentration skills. 
However, his ‘pathology’ consisted of a conviction that he was within 
his right to seek reforms. In fact, it was said his ideas had an obstinate 
character and were so intense that they determined his conduct. His 
first psychiatric assessment mentioned Grigorenko’s tendency to argue, 
construct repetitive arguments, dominate in a conversation, interrupt 
and insist on the correctness of his views, but concluded that he was a 
mentally healthy, principled and politically active person (Artemova, Rar 
and Slavinski 1971, 99–103). 
Another subject, Ivan Yakhimovich, was a Latvian dissident and 
a member of the Initiative Group for the Defence of Human Rights. 
He demonstrated no signs of hallucinations, but was diagnosed with a 
paranoid psychopathic personality for his conviction that he fulfilled 
an important mission on behalf of the Soviet people. In fact, psychia-
trists and lawyers speculated whether conviction in the rightness of 
their position and in speaking the only available truth was a common 
or anomalous trait among politically active  people –  with a crucial 
difference that prosecution saw the dissidents’ critical statements about 
the Soviet Union as being slanderous of Soviet reality. 
Taking into consideration the fact that sincere speech, stubborn-
ness, irony, strategies to derail interrogation and many cultivated eccen-
tricities (van Voren 2009) were assiduously cultivated among dissidents, 
Semyon Gluzman published a manual for dissidents or ‘agents of other- 
thinking’ in 1975. A Soviet psychiatrist, Gluzman disagreed with a 
description of ‘other- thinking’ as a psychiatric anomaly, a belief for which 
he was later convicted. Gluzman argued that Soviet psychiatry operated 
with two sets of concepts and definitions of mental illnesses. One was 
‘truly’ scientific, backed by research. The other set was pseudo- concrete, 
rooted in fuzzy and abstract assumptions, frequently with a philosoph-
ical or political cast, about what counted as a ‘normal’ person. The norm, 
he explained, presumed a person of average intelligence, unwilling to 
take risk and mainly guided by an instinct of self- preservation and a 
desire for stable employment (Gluzman 2012, 33). During psychiatric 
evaluations, Gluzman recommended dissidents to project the image of 
an average, normal person, somebody with a normal childhood, well- 
integrated, keen on sports and comfortable in mass social settings such as 
festivals (44). It was important to demonstrate lack of interest in modern 
art, theoretical mathematics and philosophy (unless it was a profes-
sional occupation); failure to do so risked a diagnosis of ‘metaphysical 
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intoxication’ (44). A single person had to cite objective circumstances 
(unemployment, illness, etc.) rather than lack of interest in marital 
relations. 
Gluzman suggested that ‘sluggish schizophrenia’ was applied to 
dissidents because it was consistent with psychiatric theory and political 
imperatives of the totalitarian state that defined ‘other- thinking’ as 
an outcome of mental pathology. His engagement with psychiatric 
theory was an attempt to redefine the very idea of ‘pathology’ that 
other dissidents sought to invert and apply to the Soviet system of 
‘behavioural bilingualism’ (Reich 2014, 567) – a system that, for 
dissidents, engendered a schizophrenic break between truth and lies, 
reality and political illusion. 
‘Other-thinking’ and totality as the primacy of the whole
Sidney Bloch and Peter Reddaway explain that psychiatry and political 
ideology of Soviet Marxism were intertwined (1977, 43). In fact, the 
Soviet Marxist concept of the collective guided Soviet psychiatry: a 
group, a collective always had priority over an individual (42). As a 
result, the task of a psychiatrist was to reintegrate a person into the 
collective through a mediating power of labour and to eradicate noncon-
formist values. The above examples show how dissidents were cast as 
‘madmen’, incapable of understanding the principles of unity of thought. 
This brings me back to my initial question about the possibility of 
dissent as ‘other- thinking’ (inakomysliye) under the conditions of totali-
tarianism.17 I have indicated that this contradiction tends to be framed 
within a realist paradigm. If the unity of thought had had empirical basis, 
then a dissident activity was not what it seemed. 
Alternatively, to acknowledge the radical possibility of other- 
thinking undermines a claim to the existence of a monolithic totalitarian 
society, but somewhat tarnishes the dissidents’ claim to exception. In 
this chapter I have adopted a different tack by showing that the notion of 
‘totalitarianism’ is valuable not as a label of an actually- existing reality, 
but as an ideation that reveals certain philosophical foundations of the 
Soviet world. I have picked examples from case studies of political abuse 
of Soviet psychiatry because they crystallise the tension between the 
official Soviet premise of the primacy of the whole and the dissidents’ 
efforts to delineate a critical space outside ‘the whole’. At the same time 
loyal (for want of a better word) Soviet citizens and dissidents shared a 
cosmological perspective of the world divided into ‘inside’ and ‘outside’.
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The idea of the primacy of the whole has a long genealogy in 
European philosophy and has found traction in anthropology as a 
mereological problem of relating (and separating) parts and wholes. 
In philosophy the argument goes like this: are parts derived from their 
whole or is the whole an abstraction from its parts (Schaffer 2010, 31)? 
The question applies to ‘gunky’ worlds where things (including social 
worlds) are composite objects that can be subdivided or reassembled into 
infinitely complex worlds (Brzozowski 2016, 58–9). The tricky bit is not 
simply to ascertain that parts and wholes are relational, but to establish 
what is fundamental: parts or their entanglements. A pluralist solution is 
numerical; it quantifies and adds parts to create an essentially atomistic 
assembly marked by boundaries and ontological categories (Schaffer 
2010, 44). A monistic perspective sees the world as an integrated system 
where components supervene (or build) on the whole, rather than the 
other way around (56–7). This produces a world where heterogeneity 
does not presume a summation of isolated entities. 
If philosophical arguments seem too abstract, anthropological 
research tends to flesh out this basic philosophical problem by looking at 
many concrete ways to carve the world. For example, Marilyn Strathern’s 
seminal essay on the reconfiguration of social relations by constructing 
and dissolving wholes into parts resists a conventional understanding of 
personhood through a membership of an individual in a group (1994). 
I suggest that, in the realm of political agglomerations, the relation 
between parts and wholes is predicated on a kind of intimacy that does 
not correspond to kinship ties. 
To press the point, the value of the primacy of the whole specifies 
both intimacy and  dissent –  political, intellectual, artistic and so  on – 
 as an imperative to remain or an attempt to explore a potentiality of 
‘outsideness’. It instantiates a tension between intimacy and estrange-
ment and harbours a conceptual contradiction: there could be no ‘outside’ 
under the conditions of totalitarianism. Nevertheless, the state agents 
and dissidents (and many other people, overlooked by grand historical 
narratives) engaged in an infinite movement between inside and outside 
of the perimeters of the Soviet cosmos. Dissidents, refuseniks, intel-
lectuals, artists, religious people, hippies, creative Marxists and others 
looked for routes  outside –  literally abroad or retreating into the obscurity 
of basements, private flats, low- profile jobs, where autonomy could 
be affirmed. It was not a choice but a prerequisite for a compromised 
freedom of exile and loss (Boym 1996). Nevertheless, a plausible ‘outside’ 
location engendered a possibility of the political otherwise. State agents 
also explored the potentialities of ‘outside’ by deporting and exiling 
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people abroad or locking them in isolated, sometimes remote spaces 
outside the official domains of legitimate personhood. 
Contrary to the scholarship that gives the notion of ‘totalitari-
anism’ little empirical basis or conceptual traction, my objective has 
been to show that Soviet totalitarianism remains a productive category 
of analysis in Soviet studies because it embodies a distinct vision of a 
social order where primacy is given to the whole rather than its parts. My 
intention has been to rework this philosophical problem as an anthropo-
logical inquiry into a mode of value creation (Munn 1986, 3). For reasons 
of genealogical continuity and parallelism with the Soviet thought that I 
cannot elaborate here, ‘totalitarianism’ as a value of the primacy of the 
whole postulates an extreme intimacy of a thing to itself (Sider 2007, 
54), of one to its parts, a crucial problem for Soviet experiment and its 
deeper conceptual lineaments. 
To rephrase, even if ‘totalitarianism’ was empirically hyperbolic, 
the priority of the whole carried a high conceptual, ethical and political 
premium in the Soviet Marxist thought and praxis. To go beyond ‘mere 
facticity’ (Munn 1986, 4) of totalitarianism, I have described a topology 
of totalitarianism that confers equivalence to the whole and its parts, the 
way clay subsumes its fluid pieces (Martino 2010, 147). The topology 
of totalitarianism, with a propensity to subtend everything into one, 
conveys an idea that a systemic world of totalitarianism can be found not 
in fact, but in the effects of its fantasy (Meltzer 2013, 86).
Estrangement and intimacy
In interviews and memoirs, many dissidents recollect a sense of isolation 
from friends and family during their incarceration and a dependence on 
dissident networks upon their release. The intimate relations with other 
dissidents proved to be a lifeline for many. It was not unconditional, as 
one could be expelled for suspected cooperation with the Soviet security 
agents, but it was vital for many, especially as many dissidents managed 
to create unofficial systems of financial and psychological support. On 
the other hand dissidents were persecuted for their infidelity to the 
Soviet people; yet upon return from prisons and psychiatric hospitals, 
many dissidents encountered ostracism and unemployment. The letters 
they addressed to the Soviet functionaries suggest that, even if they 
wanted to, former dissidents could not fully reintegrate into the Soviet 
whole. Hence physical expulsion and immigration became the way out 
of this internal isolation. 
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To conclude, I have argued that Soviet totalitarianism was 
predicated on the value of one, as the primacy of the unity of the many. In 
this historical scheme of things dissent enacted estrangement and thereby 
subtracted from the whole, while the repressive mechanism reinstated 
the intimacy with the many as the primacy of the abstract whole. 
As a political coordinate, dissent demarcated an exclusive circle of 
friendships, kinship and political activists. At the same time the intimate 
connections among dissidents severed the links with the presumed Soviet 
peoplehood and concrete people who embraced the value of unity. As 
dissent engendered estrangement from the ideology and institutions of 
the Soviet government, it was punished with another kind of estrange-
ment, including a diagnosis of madness, imprisonment and exile. 
In the Soviet context, dissent engendered estrangement and 
intimacy, while political membership also necessitated estrangement 
and intimacy to a different abstract collectivity, to a different degree. The 
concurrence of estrangement and intimacy is not specific to Soviet history 
either; it represents just one  way –  a lamentably repressive and self- 
negating one – of reworking the problem of encompassing the diverse 
many within a totality of one. Thus the above historical narratives point 
not so much to a tension between estrangement and intimacy, but rather 
to their forms, scale and intercalations. We are left with a perpetually 
awkward question of how ‘radical estrangement is compatible with a 
shared duty’ (Levy 2017, 113) in its intimate political forms. 
Notes
 1 In writing this essay, I have used the archival materials kept in the Archive of Other- Thinking 
(inakomysliye) of the International Memorial in Moscow (f.163, op.1, d.3,6.9,10,22). It 
consists of letters of political prisoners and their family members that were passed into 
different collections of samizdat archives. All personal names have been omitted with the 
exception of well- known dissident figures such as Gorbanevskaya, Faynberg, Medvedev and 
Gluzman, among others. I would like to thank Boris Belenkin and Alexei Makarov in the 
International Memorial in Moscow for their support.
 2 Originally published and circulated through samizdat in 1970.
 3 This argument reflects dissidents’ own perceptions of their work as accumulation and 
dissemination of objective facts and historical information. Some recoiled at any suggestions 
of theorising their materials. However, many dissidents, especially those of a far- right and 
nationalist ilk, have transitioned well into contemporary politics and occupy prominent 
positions in the Russian Duma (c.f. Laruelle 2015). Some dissident strategies and ‘repertoires 
of contention’ have been recently adopted in street protests and critical analysis of current 
socio- political events in Russia (Horvath 2015, 582).
 4 Yurchak appropriately links his concept of vnye to M.M. Bakhtin’s formulation of outsideness, 
or vnyenakhodimost, in the latter’s Toward the Philosophy of the Act, written between 1919 and 
1921 and first published in the USSR in 1986, after the author’s death. The concept seems 
to have gained currency among Moscow intellectuals in their discussions of dissidents and 
today’s protest politics. 
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 5 Elsewhere I have discussed a complex genealogy of official and creative Soviet Marxism that 
was explicitly built on Baruch Spinoza’s ideas of the physicality of thought and evolved in 
parallel with Gilles Deleuze. 
 6 To give the past an anthropological reading, I engage with archival materials, collections of 
Soviet diaries, texts such as memoirs and compilations of archival documents, Russian and 
English- language secondary sources and conversations with ageing dissidents, as well as 
intellectuals and civic activists in Moscow who find dissident history interesting.
 7 For example, housing, clothing and other practices of centralisation and standardisation that 
had practical and ideational value.
 8 Similarly understood as a transcendental humanist principle above and outside the 
concreteness of a political action.
 9 People who were denied (otkaz) exit visas to migrate from the Soviet Union.
10 The impression is that multiple human rights organisations in Soviet Russia and then among 
Soviet expats protested against the use of psychiatry for political purposes rather than against 
its systematic abuse of all patients. 
11 It turned out that this is a sensitive question to raise with surviving dissidents. When I asked 
a wife of one of the members of a committee against psychiatric abuse in Moscow if she 
knew how and why KGB differentiated between political dissidents and psychiatric patients, 
she responded with a scornful ‘just because’. By contrast, at a public lecture on dissidents 
in Moscow in 2018 I joined a group of young professionals (translators, historians and 
administrative staff at an international organisation) who speculated that Gorbanevskaya 
was not imprisoned because she was a single mother and Faynberg was tucked away into a 
psychiatric hospital because he lost his front teeth during the scuffle with the KGB in Red 
Square. 
12 The complete study was disseminated through samizdat and sent to Amnesty International in 
1977.
13 Some dissidents were petrified to meet violently insane inmates. Rooms were shared with 
other patients. There was no attempt to protect them from each other. 
14 Most dissidents claimed that their perspective was the only correct way of interpreting the 
world.
15 GARF (State Archive, Moscow), f.10055, op.3, d.421.
16 For a personal account of Zhores Medvedev’s incarcerations and the efforts to release him, see 
Medvedev and Medvedev (1974).
17 The Soviet example is not unique and it would be unwise to indigenise ‘totalitarianism’ as a 
culture- specific perspective and to racialise it as a ‘Russian’ propensity. In fact the primacy of 
whole, and its political entailments, had precedents in Russian intellectual and folk theories 
and history has been an enduring philosophical theme in European, including Soviet, thought, 
discussed with reference to monism or to non- dualistic, one- world theories of complexity. My 
intention is to give the well- known empirical events of August 1968 and their broader political 
and ideational context an anthropological reading.
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